A comparison of alternative methods of obtaining Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) cognizance spare parts for Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) during initial outfitting of U.S. Navy ships by Pinkerton, Kim Gregory
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1991-12
A comparison of alternative methods of obtaining
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) cognizance spare
parts for Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE)
during initial outfitting of U.S. Navy ships
Pinkerton, Kim Gregory











A Comparison of Alternative Methods of Obtaining Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) Cognizance Spare Parts for Contractor
Furnished Equipment (CFE) During Initial Outfitting ofNew




Thesis Advisor: William R. Gates
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (Dry, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943 5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
Program Element No Project Nc Work Unii Acteiiion
Number
1 1 TITLE (Include Security Classification)
A COMPARISION OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF OBTAINING DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA) COGNIZANCE SPARE PARTS
FOR CONTRACTOR FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (CFE) DURING INTIAL OUTFITTING OF NEW CONSTRUCTION U.S. NAVY SHIPS
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Pinkerton, Kim
, G.













18 SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Supply Support, Outfitting, Provisioning, Outfitting Models, Government Furnished
Materials, Contractor Furnished Material, Defense Logistics Agency Material
1 9 ABSTRACT (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis provides a limited determination of the most cost effective method of acquiring Defense Logistics Agency (DLA ) cognizance intial
outfitting material for new construction ships. The study is restricted to Contractor Furnished Material (CFM) required to support Contractor
Furnished Equipment (CFE (contained in the Hull, Mechanical, Electrical, Ordnance and Electronics (HMEO&.E) Coordinated Shipboard
Allowance List(COSAL). Three alternative methods of procuring the material are analyzed: (1 ) the shipbuilder procures the material
commercially, (2) the shipbuilder is allowed access to the Federal Supply System (FSS)and requisitions the material, (3) the Naval Supervising
Activitity (NSA) requisitions the material from the FSSin which case it becomes Government Furnished Material (GFM). Material availability
using each of the alternatives is also examined.
20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
Pi unclassihed/unumiud J same as report J l-iic users
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
William R.Gates




DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
A Comparision ofAlternative Methods of Obtaining Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) Cognizance Spare Parts
for Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) During Initial
Outfitting of U.S. Navy Ships
by,
Kim G. Pinkerton
Lieutenant Commander, Supply Corps, United States Navy
B.A., Colorado State University, 1972
M.A. , Colorado State Universtiy, 1978
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT
from the
ABSTRACT
This thesis is a limited determination of the most cost
effective method of acquiring Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
cognizance initial outfitting material for new construction ships.
The study is restricted to Contractor Furnished Material (CFM)
required to support Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) contained
in the Hull, Mechanical,. Electrical, Ordnance and Electronics
(HMEO&E) Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) . Three
alternative methods of procuring the material are analyzed for cost
effectiveness: (1) the shipbuilder procures the material
commercially, (2) the shipbuilder is allowed access to the Federal
Supply System (FSS) and requisitions the material, (3) the Naval
Supervising Activity (NSA) requisitions the material from the FSS in
which case it becomes Government Furnished Material (GFM) . Material
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This thesis attempts to improve the process of acquiring
initial outfitting allowance material for new construction
ships. It builds on studies already conducted on the
outfitting process that have challenged the methods currently
used.
The study will be limited to the spare parts required to
support end items that are considered Contractor Furnished
Equipment (CFE) contained in the Hull, Mechanical, Electrical,
Ordnance and Electronics (HMEO&E) Coordinated Shipboard
Allowance List (COSAL) . These repair parts are known as
Contractor Furnished Material (CFM)
.
The focus will be to determine the most economical and
efficient method of acquiring CFM that is National Stock
Numbered (NSN) and under the cognizance of the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA)
.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
This thesis will consider three alternatives:
1. The shipbuilder procures the material commercially.
2. The shipbuilder is allowed access to the Federal
Supply System (FSS) and requisitions the material.
3. The Naval Supervising Activity (NSA) requisitions
the material from the FSS in which case it becomes
Government Furnished Material (GFM)
.
The alternatives will be compared to ascertain if one is
more cost effective and efficient. The alternatives were
chosen because they have been used in the past, have been
recommended as possible methods by other studies, or are
currently being used today.
When examining each of the alternatives, a broad range of
costs must be considered in addition to material costs. These
costs, such as manpower costs, are not as easily discernable
as the material prices. Each alternative must have all hidden
costs included to determine the true impact on the Government.
Achieving the minimum Government cost is not the only
criteria that must be investigated. Availability of material
is as critical as cost because of the tight time schedules for
building Navy ships. Material shortages may actually cost the
Government more money in terms of work stoppage and contractor
claims than would be saved if the bottom line price of the
material is the only factor considered.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Given the above objectives, the following question was
posed: What is the most cost effective and efficient method
for the Government to provide CFM requirements under DLA
cognizance during the construction of U.S. Navy ships?
In order to answer the basic research question, the
following subsidiary questions were investigated:
1. For each alternative, what are the costs of the
material?
2. For each alternative, are there hidden opportunity costs
not normally associated with CFE material procurement
that must be included?
3. Is there a difference in the availability of material
between the three alternatives?
4. How will the alternatives affect the work loads of the
responsible commands and what is the impact?
5. What are the Naval Sea Systems Commands (NAVSEA) Program
Office's attitudes towards each of the three
alternatives?
6. Are there significant contractual changes that must be
made for each of the alternatives and do they represent
any costs to the Government?
7
.
Are funds programmed properly for implementing each
of the alternatives?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The main thrust of this study is to examine all of the
costs, along with material availability, of each of the
alternatives- The study concentrates on ships built during
the 1983-91 time frame. Ship types were chosen to represent
a broad cross section of current shipbuilding programs.
Procedures for implementing the alternatives among the various




Data was collected via literature searches, telephone
calls, and personal interviews with various people at the
headquarters and field levels. The empirical data on costs
was provided by Program Offices at NAVSEA.
The model chosen for comparing costs will formalize the
process of choosing among the alternatives. The model will
serve as a means of communication to help decision-makers and
analysts arrive at a clearer understanding of the problem.
Basically, the model will identify and value the costs
that are associated with each of the alternatives. A simple
cost comparison format will highlight the impact of the cost
on the alternatives and their totals.
Efficiency is defined as availability of material. It
will be dealt with by presenting final outfitting percentages
that programs have achieved by using one of the three
alternatives. The alternative with the best outfitting
percentage will be deemed to be the most efficient.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter I is
the introduction. Chapter II provides a background of the
problem. Chapter III describes the new construction
outfitting process for DLA material. Chapter IV addresses
availability of material under each alternative. Chapter V
consists of the cost comparisons of the alternatives. Chapter
VI presents the research conclusions and recommendations
.
II. BACKGROUND
The best method of providing Contractor Furnished Material
(CFM) has been debated for the last ten years. In order to
fully understand the data in the following chapters, a
detailed history of the CFM controversy must be presented.
Up until the early 1980s, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
material was wholly the providence of the contractor. The
shipbuilder usually procured the CFM on the commercial market,
normally using the same supplier from which he purchased the
Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) [Ref . 1] . This
responsibility was delineated in Naval Sea System Command
(NAVSEA) shipbuilding contracts [Ref. 1] . However, in many
cases, the shipbuilders were not procuring the material
themselves, they were sub-contracting the work out to firms
specializing in spare parts procurement.
About this time, the Department of Defense (DOD) began to
receive criticism for its spare parts procurement policy.
[Ref. 2:p. 52]. Because of the tremendous amount of negative
press, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) tasked the services
with reviewing their policies with an eye towards price
reduction.
In 1983, the DOD Assistant Inspector General (AIG)
conducted several inspections of initial spare part
procurements for selected major systems. The OHIO Class
submarine was one of the programs reviewed. In the audit, the
AIG team found that contractor item prices could not be
compared to the Federal Supply System (FSS) prices. But, they
noted that "the contracted negotiated rate (for purchasing
spare parts) was excessive." [Ref. 3:p. 4]. The AIG
recommended that the SSBN Strategic Submarine Program Office,
NAVSEA (PMS 396) , use the FSS for future OHIO Class
acquisitions [Ref. 3:p. 8].
In replying to the AIG, the Navy agreed with the intent of
the recommendation but felt further study was warranted. The
various "logical reasons" for continuing to obtain spares as
CFM were
:
1. The standardization of equipments and supporting spare
parts, particularly when the shipbuilder is procuring
several ship sets of equipment to support a flight of
ships;
2. The minimization of form, fit, and function problems;
3. Economies to be gained by large shipbuilder procurements;
4. The availability and timeliness of receipt of spare
parts. [Ref. 4:p. 4]
As criticism from Congress continued to mount, DOD
responded by issuing DOD Directive (DODD) 4140.40. This
required DOD activities to use the FSS as the first source of
supply [Ref. 5:p. 1] . The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
defined the Navy's position by stipulating:
That items of supply that had National Stock Numbers (NSN)
should be obtained from the FSS or through normal FSS
replenishment procurement unless it can be justified
economically and/or provided in a timely manner or prices
charged for spare parts provided by commercial contractors
are "fair and reasonable". [Ref. 6]
Despite the direction from DOD and CNO, NAVSEA continued
to support its decision to use CFM based on the following
paragraph from DODD 4140.40:
Consideration shall be given to ordering support items to
be used as spare and repair parts concurrently with
support items to be installed on end items during
production when this can be justified economically or is
justifiable for support considerations (for example, the
timely availability of the support items) and when
obsolescence of potentially unstable designs can be
managed. [Ref. 4:p. 4]
As a first step in implementing the CNO' s and DOD's
directions , NAVSEA began to conduct a series of
investigations into procurement policies. The principal test
program was the outfitting of the fourth flight of the Oliver
HAZARD PERRY Ship Class (FFG-7) . The study determined that a
sizeable portion of the CFE was under DLA cognizance and could
be obtained through the FSS. A significant cost difference
was also discovered between the price of the material in the
FSS and what the vendor charged to procure it.
The price difference occurred because the FSS had no
shipbuilder overhead and used large quantity buying power to
obtain price breaks. Using the FSS also increased outfitting
material availability at time of ship delivery and aided in
material standardization. As a result of the test program,
NAVSEA PMS 399, the FFG-7 Class Frigate Ship Acquisition
Project Manager (SHAPM) , changed its policy for the last
eleven hulls of the FFG-7 Class Frigate Program. Detailed
data from the FFG-7 program will be presented later in this
thesis
.
In reporting the FFG-7 findings to the DOD AIG, the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics)
(ASN (S&L) ) noted "preliminary results indicate that
utilization of DLA systems to the fullest extent is economical
and efficient" [Ref 7] . Specifically, it was noted that "it
was economical in most cases to use the Federal Supply System
and it is efficient to use the FSS for initial outfitting
material managed by the DLA" [Ref 7] . Additionally, "the
system was responsive to new construction program initial
outfitting requirements such that outfitting readiness goals
could be met" [Ref 7]
.
Even though the FFG-7 study supported using the FSS,
NAVSEA continued to have concerns based on availability of
material and manpower costs. The opinions of the SHAPMs in
response to the FFG-7 study and AIG audit report were
expressed in a NAVSEA SEA 91 memo, in April 1986. The major
worries were:
1. If SHAPMs use FSS to requisition material, it would
deplete the stock of material positioned to support the
operating forces, possibly forcing them to go without
required material.
2. It would increase the Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion and Repair, USN (SUPSHIP) workload and the
Outfit Supply Activity (OSA) - the result of which would
be to fall short of the 97% outfitting goal.
3. Converting a fill or kill requisition into Government
Furnished Material (GFM) would result in a contract
modification requirement after each Incremental Stock
Number Status Listing (ISNSL) to send rejected items to
the contractor to buy.
4
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Tracking material would be more complicated and less
accurate. [Ref 8:p. 3-5]
Opponents of using the FSS also pointed out that material
requirements for outfitting new construction ships were not
forecasted to the FSS. Therefore, DLA would not have material
on-hand to support both active and new construction ships. In
addition, the budget for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
(SCN) was allotted on the basis of forecasted requirements.
Addition of the CFM material would result in a shortage of SCN
outfitting dollars.
After reviewing the AIG and FFG-7 reports, the ASN (S&L)
directed that the shipbuilder use the FSS as the first source
of supply for outfitting/interim support requirements [Ref.
9] . It was then up to NAVSEA to implement the procedures to
carry out this direction.
NAVSEA has developed Technical Specification (TECHSPEC)
Number: S0300-A2-SPN-010 . The purpose of the TECHSPEC is to
provide procedures for shipbuilders to gain access to the FSS.
Problems have been encountered, however, that have forced
NAVSEA to suspend the TECHSPEC. Naval Supply Systems Command
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(NAVSUP) is currently working on procedures that would allow
this TECHSPEC to be implemented.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides a
further complication for Program Managers wanting to allow the
shipbuilder access to the FSS . FAR clause 51.100 requires a
study be conducted for a shipbuilding program to determine if
it is in the Government's "best interest" to allow access
[Ref. 10:p. 51-1]. If it is, then the study's findings must
be placed in the contract. The cost of the study and the
resulting contract changes are additional burdens for which
many Program Managers do not have the funds
.
It was not until the SSBN 740 was built in FY 1988 that
NAVSEA PMS 3 96 got an opportunity to implement the AIG
recommendation to fill requirements through the FSS [Ref.
11 :p. 8] . NAVSEA PMS 3 96 had to determine if they wanted the
shipbuilder to pull the material from the system, thus keeping
it CFM, or have the Naval Supervising Activity (NSA)
requisition the material, making it GFM [Ref ll:p. 2],
One of the primary results of their study was to question
the cost effectiveness of allowing the shipbuilder access to
the FSS to obtain DLA material. In their study, they have
shown that a further reduction in cost of CFM material is
possible if the Government requisitions the material from the
FSS and provides it to the contractor. [Ref 11 :p. 13] The PMS
396 study is discussed in greater detail later in this paper.
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Current shipbuilding programs continue to specify that the
shipbuilder is responsible for procuring DLA material. The
only exception is the AOE-6, USS SUPPLY, shipbuilding program.
Here the NSA is SUPSHIP, San Diego. SUPSHIP, San Diego, has
begun buying all CFE under $100.00 from the FSS.
The above has been a brief history of the CFE material
procurement practices. The next chapter will describe the
spare part outfitting process for DLA material.
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III. INITIAL OUTFITTING MATERIAL
Providing initial outfitting material to a U.S. Navy ship
is a complicated, time consuming, and expensive process. For
purposes of this thesis, the term "outfitting material" will
apply to those items of material required as a result of the
defined allowances, specifications, and documentation of ships
being constructed.
As noted earlier, the process of providing this material
has been under review for some time. A lack of definitive
policy guidance has been blamed for the Navy's poor showing
during audits and reviews. Following the tenants of Total
Quality Leadership, NAVSUP initiated a Process Action Team
(PAT) to investigate the process and make recommendations for
improvement. At the invitation of NAVSUP, NAVSEA agreed to
join the New Construction PAT.
One of the objectives of the PAT process was to define the
nominal process that detailed the "flow of all data, actions,
decisions, products, and events related to provisioning and
outfitting, from the award of a ship construction contract to
sailaway with all spares on board". [Ref. 12 :p. 7] However,
the study found that a multiplicity of procedures were being
followed simultaneously by various commands [Ref. 12:p. 2].
Rather than describe all of the variations that exist, the
nominal process presented by the PAT will be discussed.
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Providing outfitting material begins with the generation
of technical documentation by the design and ordering process
and ends when the ship has received all initial allowance
material [Ref. 13:p. 5]. The talents and skills of a large
number of people are required to achieve the goal of having
97% outfitting material onboard by ship delivery [Ref. 14:
Enclosure 1]
.
There are five stages to providing outfitting material to
a ship. They are: provisioning, configuration development,
allowance preparation, outfitting, and fitting out. See
Figure 1
.
It is impossible to cover in depth the five stages in just
one chapter. Instead, the procedure will be outlined so that
readers unfamiliar with the topic can better understand the
material presented in later chapters
.
A. PROVISIONING
Provisioning extends over a wide range of functions. They
include "design, development, maintenance planning, supply,
requirements determination, item entry control, procurement,
cataloging, and contract administration." [Ref. 5:p. 1] The
goal of provisioning is to deliver a range and depth of
support items for initial outfitting or lay-in of in-service
support at supply activities. It must be done for each






























- Transfer to Ship's Crew
Figure 1. Outfitting Supply Support Procedures
The provisioning process actually starts during the
feasibility and preliminary contract design phase [Ref.
12: Appendix B] . Logistics Support Analyses (LSA) are
conducted to ensure that the required contract line items,
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work statements, and Contracts Data Requirements Lists (CDRL)
are included in the contract.
Provisioning culminates with the development of allowance
lists and the lay-in of material. The allowance list is the
end product of the provisioning process and the building
blocks of the ship' s Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List
(COSAL) [Ref. 15:p. 8].
Provisioning is a joint responsibility between the Chief
of Naval Operations, NAVSEA, the In-Service Engineering Agents
(ISEA) , the vendors, and SPCC [Ref. 15:p. 8]. Each
organization has a specific task it must accomplish for
provisioning to be successful. Figure 2 outlines the
provisioning process and the relationships of the
participating commands.
The equipment's Program Manager at NAVSEA is responsible
for developing the maintenance concept, the performance data,
and installation schedules [Ref. 15:p. 8]. This data is used
by SPCC in developing the range and depth of required
spares
.
The equipment manufacturer is required by MIL-STD-1561A
and MIL-STD-1552A to submit Provisioning Technical
Documentation (PTD) . PTD is for "identification, selection
and determination of initial requirements and for the
cataloging of support items." [Ref. 5:p. 3-1]
The vendor also furnishes Supplemental Provisioning
Technical Documentation (SPTD) along with the PTD to provide
16
PROVISIONING RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
- Configuration Requirements
- Logistic Support Doctrine































REPAIR PARTS /SUPPORT ITEMS
ALLOWANCE LISTS REPAIR PARTS/SUPPORT ITEMS
ALLOWANCE LISTS
— ' > END ITEM (SHIP)
Figure 2. Provisioning Process and Command Responsibilities.
(Source : Small, W., "A Decision Strategy for the Acquisition of CVN
Q-COSAL Target Date Material", MS Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School
1991)
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additional information. SPTD is used to assign National Stock
Numbers (NSNs) , ensure standardization, and assist in
preparing allowance lists.
The ISEAs combine the input from the Program Manager and
the PTD to develop Lead Allowance Parts Lists (LAPL) . SPCC
uses the LAPLs to compute the initial spares and wholesale
stock requirements needed to support the equipment.
A key objective in the provisioning process is to ensure
that Item Managers (IM) of equipment at DLA and SPCC are
alerted of expected increases in demands caused by new
installations of equipment. For DLA items, Supply Support
Requests (SSR) are sent to the Defense Logistics Agency
Network. For items managed by SPCC, the IMs also receive
SSRs.
Using the inputs from the PTD and SPTD, SPCC generates
Allowance Parts Lists (APL) and Allowance Equipage Lists (AEL)
[Ref. 15:p. 10]. The APL provides a complete list of all
maintenance worthy parts for an equipment.
All of the above data is placed in a number of different
data systems to ease making supply decisions. One of those
systems is the Weapon System File (WSF) . The WSF maintains
the configurations of all Navy ships and repair parts data in
two separate files.
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Level A of the WSF contains information about the ship and
a listing of equipments installed on the ship. The ship's
Unit Identification Codes (UIC) and equipments are linked by
Repairable Identification Codes (RIC) and
Application/Identification Number Activity Codes (AINAC) [Ref
.
16 :p. 12] . It is important that the accuracy of Level A be
maintained because it is through this file that a ship
receives its piece parts support [Ref. 2:p. 16].
Level C of the WSF maintains the piece part information
for APLs/AELs developed during the provisioning and cataloging
process. Level C entries are those in which the APL
represents a maintenance worthy system, equipment, or
components. Level C contains information about the equipment,
Next Higher and Next Lower Assemblies (NHAs/NLAs) , a breakdown
of the parts associated with the APL, technical information
that applies to the parts, and supplemental, narrative data
[Ref. 16 :p. 13] . The entries in Level C are tied back to the
end use items in Level A.
B. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Configuration Management (CM) is the foundation of an
effective logistic support system. It is a key driver for
cost efficient, well supported equipment, and impacts ship
19
operation, repair, maintenance, and modernization [Ref . 16:p.
1] •
More than just tracking which systems and equipment are
installed on a ship, configuration management is the combined





5. Configuration Status Accounting [Ref. 16:p. 1]
Historically, Configuration Status Accounting (CSA) has
been the focus of CM. Until recently, the Navy used the WSF
Level A as the central repository for ship configuration and
associated logistic support information.
In the early 1980s, the Navy transitioned to the Ship's
Configuration and Logistics Information System (SCLSIS) . The
Level A of the WSF is still used by SPCC to build the
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance Lists (COSAL) but it is now
updated via the SCLSIS database, the Real Time Operation
Management Information System (ROMIS) , and Fitting Out
Management Information System (FOMIS) . These three
configuration management systems are discussed below since it
is through these systems that a new construction ship is
20
identified with its installed equipments. Figure 3

















Figure 3. Configuration Data Management Flow
1. SCLSIS
SCLSIS goes beyond the CSA emphasis contained in the
WSF Level A. More than just an ADP system, SCLSIS is a set
of rules and procedures for managing the total configuration
management of a ship [Ref . 17] .
In SCLSIS, each ship class has an activity assigned as
the Configuration Data Manager (CDM) . After CDMs "initialize"
the class into SCLSIS, they are responsible for the total
configuration of the ships [Ref. 16:p. 2] . The CDM is the
single activity with authority to update the SCLSIS database.
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The CDM inputs data into SCLSIS that reflects the
authorized equipments installed as well as supply support
requirements, technical manuals, Planned Maintenance System
data, and a variety of other technical information. The
SCLSIS database is also used to update the Shipboard
Nontactical ADP Program (SNAP) II computers on board ships.
While Level A of the WSF was designed around one logistic
element, supply support, SCLSIS uses configuration to drive
several logistic elements vice just the one [Ref. 16:p. 26].
The procedure for initializing new construction ships
into SCLSIS varies. For the FFG-7 Class, the ships were
initialized after they were built. The shipbuilder and SPCC
worked with the CDM, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, to ensure the
accuracy of the data the CDM loaded into SCLSIS. For ships
currently under construction such as the DDG-51, the
shipbuilder can input directly to the SCLSIS database via
ROMIS.
2 . ROMIS
ROMIS is the Navy' s newest management tool for
documenting configuration data and tracking provisioning and
allowance preparation. ROMIS is maintained by the
shipbuilders on personal computers at the shipyards [Ref.
12:p. 26]. This allows real time on-site database updating.
22
If ROMIS is invoked in the contract, the shipbuilder
can directly update the SCLSIS database and the WSF via tape.
In addition, the shipbuilder can be designated as the CDM or
can feed the data directly to the appropriate activity.
One desirable attribute of ROMIS is that it allows
technical drawings and piece part information to be tied to
configuration records. In addition, ROMIS has a material
management function that automates certain segments of the




FOMIS is the integrated management system that was the
predecessor to ROMIS. FOMIS also provides an automated format
for tracking the configuration of new construction ships but
it tracks the progress and status of installed equipment at
the APL/AEL level [Ref 2:p. 18].
One of the biggest drawbacks to FOMIS is the increased
administrative burdens it causes. FOMIS is updated monthly
and reports have to be requested from SPCC. By the time the
information is received, it is often stale and must be
validated [Ref. 12:p. 26]. FOMIS cannot provide V09 tapes to
SCLSIS so a lot of useful information, such as drawing






Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL)
The goal of provisioning and configuration management
is to build the allowance documents that establish stocks of
retail-consumer inventory on ships. The allowance list tells
the ship what material, and what quantity of that material, it
is allowed to carry. The information on the APLs/AELs form
the foundation of the COSAL.
The COSAL is both a supply and a technical document.
As a supply document, it contains a list of parts and
allowance quantities and provides cross references to permit
identification of stock numbers. It's a technical document
because it provides a description of nomenclature, operating
characteristics, and technical manuals. In short, the COSAL
is the bridge between the manufacturer' s part number and the
stock number recognized by the system [Ref. 15:p. 10].
2 . COSAL Computation Techniques
There are six computational models that calculate the
range and depth of material in a COSAL. Of the six, three are
used in special situations and will not be discussed. The
three that reflect the current methods at SPCC are:
1. Modified Fleet Logistic Support Improvement Program (MOD-
FLSIP) Allowance Model. A modified version of the FLSIP
model used in the 1970s, the MOD-FLSIP model increases
the insurance stockage of certain items in the COSAL.
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2. Maintenance Criticality Oriented (MCO) Allowance Model.
Used on FFG-36 through FFG-59.
3. TRIDENT Allowance Model. Used for material specific to
TRIDENT Class SSBN submarines.
a. MOD-FLSIP
The primary allowance concept in use today is the
Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program (FLSIP) . In the
FLSIP, each item (NSN) on an APL is a candidate for stocking.
The FLSIP computation asks three questions in determining the
allowances [Ref 18]. First, can the ship remove and replace
the item? Second, what is the number of equipments aboard?
Third, what is the Best Replacement Factor (BRF) (usage data)
of the NSN?
If the item is in one or more pieces of equipment
and can be removed and replaced at sea, then the item meets
the "range cut". All range cuts are then further subjected to
the FLSIP algorithm to determine if they qualify for stocking.
If the item has an expected demand of one in 90
days, then the item is stocked as a demand based item. If the
item has a demand greater than one in every four years, the
item is stocked as an insurance item. Additionally, there are
a large number of items that are stocked as safety items and
for planned maintenance requirements.
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The MOD-FLSIP procedure is exactly the same as the
FLSIP except it expands the number of insurance items and
doubles their depth [Ref 15:p. 13], If an item on a primary
piece of equipment has a demand of one in ten years, the item
is stocked. For insurance items with a demand of at least two
but less than four, the depth is increased to two from one.
The MOD-FLSIP translates to an increase of 25% in
the number of line items carried over the FLSIP model. This
also equates to a 37% price increase in the cost of a ship's
storeroom items [Ref 15:p. 13].
Jb. MCO
The MCO COSAL was applied to only the fourth flight
of the FFG-7s. It is included in this discussion because the
thesis uses a large body of data for these ships.
The philosophy behind the MCO COSAL was to increase
the number of "critical" spares while staying within the cost
of a FLSIP COSAL. To do this, all equipments were rated as to
their criticality in completing the ship's missions. The
higher the Mission Criticality Code (MCC) , the more emphasis
the equipment received. Using the same algorithm as the
TRIDENT model, the MCO was developed to emphasize critical
equipments [Ref 15:p. 14].
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c. TRIDENT Allowance Model.
This model is used to compute allowance quantities
for TRIDENT SSBN submarines. It provides variable protection
level based on unit price and Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM)
Military Essentiality Codes (MEC) [Ref 15:p. 10]. As with the
MCO, the emphasis is on providing on board support for
critical equipments.
3. Incremental Stock Number Sequence List (ISNSL)
ISNSLs are a series of lists which contain the
computed depth and range of storeroom items at certain points
during the ship's construction [Ref. 13:p. 5]. The objective
is to facilitate the efficient procurement of Government and
Contractor Furnished Material [Ref. 2:p. 22].
ISNSLs are extracted on scheduled intervals based on
the completed configuration records resident in the WSF Level
A and any processed PTD packages [Ref. 12 :p. 27] . In addition
to the identified ship's allowances, the ISNSL also breaks






Outfitting entails ordering, funding, expediting, follow-
up, and receipt of material identified by allowance lists [Ref
13 :p. 4] . The outfitting process begins at the time material
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requirements are identified [Ref 2:p. 23]. The first step is
allowance list processing.
The Naval Supervising Activity (NSA) is the focal point
for processing the allowance lists. After carefully reviewing
the ISNSLs produced by SPCC, the NSA sorts the requirements.
Some of the requirements are passed to the shipbuilder as
Contractor Furnished Material (CFM) while others go to the
Outfit Supply Activity (OSA) as Government Furnished Material
(GFM)
.
The OSA is the activity that procures all GFM specified in
the allowance lists. Their tasks are to:
1. Introduce Government furnished requisitions into the
supply system.
2. Control and account for SCN funds.
3. Provide requisition and material status for all items.
4. Expedite as necessary [Ref 2:p. 24],
Before the NSA passes the requisitions to the OSA, GF
requirements are screened against excess assets available in
the SCN Consolidated Residual Asset Management Program
(SCRAMP) [Ref 12:p. 34]. SCRAMP is an excess SCN material
program funded by NAVSEA and operated by the Fitting Out and
Supply Support Assistance Center (FOSSAC)
.
Once all material is on order, management attention at the
NSA turns towards monitoring and expediting requisition
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status. Again, the goal is to have 97% of the outfitting
material on board prior to sail away.
E. FITTING OUT
According to Masters, fitting out is a subset of
outfitting [Ref. 2:p. 24]. Fitting out refers to placing the
received material in bins on board the ships. Although MIL-
STD-1339B uses the terms interchangeably, it is more
appropriate to consider fitting out the end product of
outfitting as this is when the ship's crew assumes
responsibility for the material [Ref. 19:p. 9].
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IV. CONSIDERATIONS IN TRANSFERRING DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
(DLA) CONTRACTOR FURNISHED MATERIAL (CFM) TO GOVERNMENT
FURNISHED MATERIAL (GFM)
The original intent of this thesis was to analyze the cost
differences between CFM and GFM. However, during almost every
interview conducted, the cost differences between CFM and GFM
were not an issue. The real concerns were availability of
material, the budgetary implications, and contractual changes
required to facilitate the transfer.
To address the full economic and political impact of
making the transfer from CFM to GFM, each of the these areas
are discussed. However, a caveat must be interjected at this
point. As noted in the New Construction Streamlining Study,
each shipbuilding program is a compilation of different
contractual clauses, requirements, and even philosophies [Ref.
12 :p. 3]. As a result, there are a variety of different
variables that must be considered for each individual program
contemplating transferring CFM to GFM. To describe each
variable and the required actions before the transfer process
can occur is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, this
chapter will demonstrate that if a Ship Program Manager (SPM)
is interested in studying the transfer option, there is
historical data to support that move. This chapter will also
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discuss possible pitfalls that may confront the SPM and
solutions that have been found to avoid them.
A. AVAILABILITY OF MATERIAL
The availability of material for both outfitting new
construction ships and supporting operating ships was, and is,
the principle concern of everyone in the outfitting field.
People tend to use the availability of material to support
their particular point of view in defending or opposing the
transfer from CFM to GFM. In addition, the availability of
material might involve costs that have to be included when
doing later cost analyses
.
To address this issue, the findings of the FFG-7 and the
OHIO Class Submarine studies along with data from the USS
SUPPLY (AOE-6)
,
will be analyzed. Then, procedures and
problems affecting availability discussed during interviews
with DLA, SPCC, and Program Management personnel will be
presented. Finally, cost considerations that would result
from changing current procedures to ensure availability are
addressed.
1 . FFG-7 Test Program Results
As already noted, a test program was initiated that
transferred all DLA material from CFM to GFM for FFGs 54 and
57
.
Going into the test program, availability was one of the
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primary concerns. Because of this, the Ship Acquisition
Project Manager (SHAPM) , PMS 399, tracked outfitting
percentages very carefully [Ref. 1]. 1
There were three questions the test program was
interested in answering [Ref. 1]. The first was whether
outfitting goals for DLA material could be reached. The
second was whether the "churn" in the Incremental Stock Number
Sequence List (ISNSL) process would result in the procurement
of excess material. "Churn" occurs when subsequent ISNSLs
modify the range and depth of stocked material. The third was
whether deletion of the NSN material would leave the
shipbuilder with the most difficult material to obtain and
jeopardize the outfitting readiness goals.




Converting DLA managed items from CFM to GFM and
requisitioning through the Federal Supply System (FSS)
was successful and did not inhibit reaching the
outfitting readiness goals.
2. The pilot tests showed the "Fill or Kill" technique would
not have to be used for DLA managed material because DLA
was responsive even in a backorder situation.
3. The residual CFM items left for the commercial
shipbuilder to procure, which were originally thought to
be the most difficult and which could possibly impact the
l
. In 1988, NAVSEA changed the designation of program




shipbuilder' s ability to reach the outfitting readiness
goals, proved not to be a problem. [Ref . 1]
Table 1 provides the statistics for the transferred
DLA cognizance material for the FFG-54 and the FFG-57 [Ref
20]. As can be seen, the percent received was 99.4 for the
FFG-54 and 98.9% for FFG-57, well above OPNAV s required 97%.
TABLE 1
CFM TO GFM CONVERSION












% RECEIVED 99.4% 98.9%
Based on these results, PMS 399 implemented the CFM to
GFM transfer for FFGs 56 and 58 - 61. Figure 4 provides the


















































GFM, for all FFG-7s. 2 As can be seen from Figure 4, the final
percentages for the fourth flight of ships were as good if not
better than the percentages for ships before the transfer. In
fact, the transfer actually improved the final percentages for
the fourth flight [Ref . 20]
.
2 . OHIO Class Submarine Study
The procedure used by PMS 396 to designate items for
transfer from CFM to GFM was different than PMS 399' s. Rather
than transferring all DLA material from CFM to GFM, PMS 396
opted to transfer an item only if the FSS had the DLA items in
stock [Ref. 21]. SPCC conducted the review to determine
eligibility. If an item was in stock, the NSA was tasked with
procuring it [Ref. ll:p. 2]. If not, the shipbuilder was
responsible for obtaining it.
Prior to this study, PMS 396 had been concerned with
the poor performance of the shipbuilder in providing CFM on
the SSBN 734 [Ref. 22] . CFM availability at SSBN 734 delivery
was only 95.9%, well below the acceptable 97% [Ref. 23]. In
fact, the Government had to obtain 1.4% of the 95.9% to assist
the shipbuilder. As a result, PMS 396 and the shipbuilder
2 The values for the FFG-54 and 57 in Figure 4 differ
from those in Table 1. Figure 4 represents the final
percentages for all outfitting material while Table 1 is just
DLA GFM.
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applied significant management attention to alleviate the
problem with only minimal success [Ref . 23]
.
Based on the results of their CFM initial outfitting
study on SSBN 735 and the FFG-7 program's results, PMS 396 has
made contractual changes to transfer qualifying DLA items from
CFM to GFM for SSBNs 740-742 [Ref. 22] . To validate results
of the policy change, PMS 396 will be tracking material
availability closely throughout construction of these
submarines
.
3. USS SUPPLY (AOE-6)
The Naval Supervising Activity (NSA) for the USS
SUPPLY (AOE-6) is Superintendent of Shipbuilding, Conversion
and Repair (SUPSHIP) , San Diego. SUPSHIP San Diego is using
a third procedure to identify items to transfer from CFM to
GFM. SUPSHIP personnel review the allowance data on
Contractor Furnished DLA items for the cost of each item. All
items under $100.00 are automatically transferred to GFM. The
NSA has processed up through the sixth incremental and has
transferred 8539 items from CFM to GFM [Ref. 24] . Of these
requisitions, 7107 (83%) have been received. Since the AOE-6
is still 14 months from delivery, the NSA is confident that
all FSS requisitioned material will be on-hand [Ref. 24].
The NSA has identified approximately 2000 items, with
an estimated value of $1.5 M, for the shipbuilder to procure.
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Of this number, the shipbuilder has returned 28 items to NSA
responsibility because their bid price was too high compared
to the FSS's price. Table 2 lists those 28 items and their
price differences.
TABLE 2











006137245 1 $5720.00 $17153.00 000876637 1 $353.77 $6001.91
008369905 1 $152.10 $619.00 004501604 1 $976.00 $2241.60
008420520 1 $381.00 $1125.00 004998098 1 $391.00 $1100.00
010189471 4 $141.30 $334.50 005480481 1 $430.50 $1373.00
010192736 4 $11.74 $573.15 006562881 1 $440.83 $1791.38
010325605 1 $681.50 $2310.94 005759297 3 $948.00 $1882.82
010418307 1 $926.40 $1632.00 006011039 1 $1160.00 $2015.69
010489894 1 $1800.00 $2831.46 006011236 1 $2160.00 $6724.25
011194682 1 $682.00 $1449.58 006011279 8 $2420.00 $5031.00
011212567 1 $383.00 $1000.00 006011317 24 $1330.00 $4463.00
011219701 1 $2017.40 $6661.20 006011423 1 $616.00 $1284.00
011224358 1 $632.48 $2284.59 006026779 4 $1930.00 $4318.00
011670030 1 $162.95 $500.00 006026786 1 $1590.00 $3281.20
011751106 1 $140.80 $1120.00 006026815 1 $2160.00 $5723.90
The information in this table is an example of the
extreme material price differences that can occur between the
37
FSS and the commercial market. The total cost of the FSS was
$7840.80 while the total bid prices from the product's vendors
was $86,753.67, a price mark-up of over 1,100%.
4
. Availability Problems
One consideration should be noted when discussing the
above programs. In addition to stock procured to meet the
inventory levels required by Ship Selected Records (SSR) , DLA
builds inventory levels on demand data from operational units
plus a "fudge factor" [Ref. 25]. The additional buildup in
inventory levels from demand data plus the "fudge factor" has
allowed the FFG-7, the OHIO Class Submarine, and the AOE-6
programs to draw material from the FSS for outfitting without
effecting Fleet requirements.
For a new program that is building it's first ships,
DLA won't have the benefit of operational demand to drive up
inventory levels. This could present a problem if outfitting
requirements aren't identified during the early stages of a
program.
Interviews with both SPCC and DLA personnel confirm
new programs could be a problem. The DLA representative feels
that new programs, and the first year of demands after the
transfer in a mature program, could be a problem until DLA
procures more inventory [Ref. 25] .
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The required communication between the Navy and DLA is
an issue that must be addressed. One of the major concerns at
SPCC is that the SSR and Ship Provisioning Requests (SPR)
process generates inventory stock but does not generate any
buys for material to be used in outfitting [Ref . 26] .
Currently, to provide a build up of inventory from the SSR
process, DLA requires that a SSR contain an anticipated demand
of five for each item [Ref- 27]
.
Although the system has supported transferring CFM to
GFM without formal communications, both DLA and SPCC feel the
planning process needs to be modified. Representatives at DLA
believe a process agreed to by both parties needs to be
developed because they are reluctant to buy material in
anticipation of sales [Ref. 28] . With appropriate planning
data, DLA does not anticipate any problems if they could be




Range and depth of material
2 When requisitions would begin
3. Production schedules
Even if DLA received prior planning information, and
was able to stock up early in the shipbuilding program,
problems might occur with the lead ship. Since the last
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incremental, which occurs just six months before delivery,
contains 20% of the configuration, material might not be
available [Ref . 27] . However, DLA statistics show that their
requisition response time for new material is less than ninety
days. Thus, a six month lead time should be sufficient to
provide the material to the NSA [Ref. 25]
.
5 . Manpower Concerns
In terms of workload, DLA does not feel that the
increased demand caused by transferring CFM to GFM would have
an impact on their operation [Ref. 28] . Since they handle
over 3,000,000 requisitions a year, the possible increase of
60,000 requisitions would not make an significant impact.
Funding to cover the costs of receiving, storing,
transporting, and administration is covered in their
surcharge. This is included in the price of the item [Ref.
28] .
SPCC personnel, on the other hand, feel that they do
not have the manpower to process the additional SSRs that will
be generated to increase GFM inventory levels at DLA [Ref.
27]. Also, changing the incremental processing system to
accommodate the CFM to GFM transfer would require the addition
of a second person [Ref. 27] . Therefore, a total of two
individuals at the GS-11 level would be required at SPCC if
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all shipbuilding programs were to adopt the CFM to GFM
procedure -
Both the FFG-7 [Ref 20] and the OHIO Class Submarine
[Ref 21] programs found that the impact on the OSA was not
significant. No additional manpower requirements were
required for either program.
6 . Conclusions
Shipbuilding programs that have opted to transfer CFM
to GFM have not encountered the shortage problems that many-
thought would occur. In fact, the results are just the
opposite. The FSS was shown to be more responsive than the
shipbuilder in the FFG-7 program and has so far supported the
AOE-6 program well. More importantly, operational units have
not suffered [Ref. 20] .
This not to say that all shipbuilding programs should
be automatically transferred to GFM without first exploring
the concerns expressed above. In addition, budgetary and
contractual issues must be considered.
B. BUDGETARY IMPACT
Funding for procurement of both CFM and GFM is part of the
Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) under the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy, (SCN) appropriation line . The SPMs use two
different accounts for the procurement of material. The
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first, the SCN End Item Account, is managed by the SPM and is
provided to the shipbuilder to use in buying all CFM. The
second, the SCN Outfitting Account, is managed by NAVSEA 04MS
for buying GFM. NAVSEA 04MS sends funding documents to the
OSA when notified that a NSA has submitted requisitions for
GFM.
Since the outfitting funds are in separate accounts, the
funds cannot be mixed. SCN End Item funds cannot be
transferred to SEA 04MS for GFM purchases and SCN Outfitting
Account funds cannot be given to the shipbuilder for CFM.
[Ref . 29] . The division of outfitting funds into the two SCN
accounts is a potential problem for the SPM who is interested
in transferring CFM to GFM.
Program managers have gotten around this constraint in
various ways. The FFG-7 program had enough flexibility in the
SCN Outfitting Account to absorb the additional increases in
GFM for all their FFG-7s [Ref. 30] . The dollar value of the
8539 items transferred for the AOE-6 has been so insignificant
that the NSA has been able to absorb it in their SCN
Outfitting Account [Ref. 24]
.
PMS 396 plans on providing SCN End Item funds into their
outfitting account at the OSA to cover the increase caused by
the transfer for CFM to GFM [Ref. 29] . PMS 396 has expressed
a note of caution about their methodology. It leaves a
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significant amount of money unobligated for a extended period
while waiting for the incremental to be processed. This delay
could leave the money visible to the Office of the Comptroller
of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) and therefore it runs the risk of being
taken away. PMS 396 must be more vigilant than usual to
ensure this doesn't happen [Ref. 29].
C. CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS
Shipbuilding contracts let at NAVSEA contain a "changes
clause" that allows the SPM to modify the contract either
unilaterally, by direction of the Government, or bilaterally
by agreement between the contractor and the Government [Ref.
2:p. 58]. The transfer of CFM to GFM could take place as
either.
In the FFG-7 program, a contract modification was not
required as the Government just modified the list of items
that it required the shipbuilder to buy [Ref. 20] . The OHIO
Class Submarine program was in the process of letting new
contracts for SSBNs 740-742 when they decided to make the
transfer from CFM to GFM. They modified the contract to
include an unpriced Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) that
directed the shipbuilder to buy CFM only when told to do so
and after they had received the funding [Ref. 22] . The AOE-6
program has stayed within the current limits of their contract
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and it has not been modified [Ref . 24] . NAVSEA PMS 400, the
SPM for DDG-51, feels that it is within the limits of MIL-STD
1339B for them to tell the shipbuilder what to buy, so a




As was discussed in Chapter IV, the FFG-7, OHIO Class
Submarine and the AOE-6 programs have transferred all or
portions of their CFM to GFM. This chapter will analyze the
differences in costs that would occur in the programs if the
material were obtained using each of the three alternatives.
The first section of the chapter will provide a background on
the Cost Analysis studies and the final section will compare
the three programs to demonstrate the costs of the
alternatives
.
A. COST ANALYSIS BACKGROUND
In today's fiscal environment, and as guardians of the
public trust, no Program Manager (PM) can afford to spend
money unwisely. It is incumbent upon Government personnel to
evaluate all possible options when procuring material and
choose the procedure that makes the most economic sense.
In order to determine the best approach, the PM needs to
rely on special tools to assist in making the hard decisions.
One of those tools is Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)
.
CBA helps policy makers with decisions concerning the most
productive use of their resources. CBA is a "tool for
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systematically developing useful information about the
desirable and undesirable effects of a public sector program."
[Ref. 32:p. 1]
As traditionally done, CBAs are concerned with welfare
economics which provide the potential costs and benefits of a
project. However, as is often the case with the military,
programs are decided upon before hand and the only question
that remains is what is the most cost effective way of
completing the project. This type of CBA is known as a Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)
.
A CEA is "any analytic study designed to assist a
decision-maker in identifying a preferred choice among
possible alternatives." [Ref. 33 :p. 1] A CEA addresses the
problem of maximizing effectiveness subject to a constraint
measured in terms of a budget [Ref. 34 :p. 18] . It is
appropriate when:
1) there is no market evaluation of alternative outputs,
as in the defense sector and 2) the resource inputs can be
appropriately evaluated at market prices [Ref. 34:p. 18].
Steiss [Ref. 35 :p. 105] further refines the definition of
CEAs by stating that "the actual impact of resource
commitments in terms of program performance represents
effectiveness." Blanchard notes that one use of CEAs
involves evaluating two alternative systems using logistics
factors [Ref. 36:p. 159]
.
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An argument can effectively be made that the CFM
outfitting question poised by this thesis is a CEA. The
primary question being poised is which alternative is the most
cost advantageous to the government. Since the three
proposals have the same benefits, the main thrust of the
thesis is to determine the one with the lowest costs. This
approach coincides with the definition of a cost effectiveness
analysis as presented by Anthony and Young [Ref. 37:p. 315].
The following factors help substantiate this position:
1. The decision to build the ships with the subsequent
requirement of CFM has already been made.
2. The same amount of material must be acquired regardless
of the alternative chosen, thus all benefits are the
same
.
3. The cost elements determining final costs are not the
same across the three alternatives.
The cost estimates will be developed within the framework
of cost-element lists which are subdivisions of cost
categories [Ref. 38 :p. 84]. All costs associated with the
three alternatives that have been identified through
interviews and research are included. Cost estimates of each
the alternatives can then be derived through calculations of
the various cost elements.
Since the data obtained is not just from one single year
or program, it will need to be adjusted for inflation or
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discounted depending on the situation. The inflation rates in
Table 3 are used to express costs in a common year's dollars.
They were obtained from the Office of the Comptroller, Navy
(NAVCOMPT) , and are used during the normal yearly budget
process [Ref . 39] . 3 If any numbers have to be discounted, the
discount rate will be 10%, the standard rate as published by
OMB Circular A - 76 [Ref. 40] .
TABLE 3
PRICE INFLATION/ESCALATION ANNUAL RATES
FY 81 FY 82 FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 FY 86 FY 87 FY 88 FY 89
67.08% 69.84% 72.17% 74.53% 77.12% 79.98% 83.10% 86.41% 89.79%
FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97
93.21% 96.59% 100.00% 103.46% 106.99% 110.63% 114.39% 118.28%
The table format used in this thesis is the same as
NAVSEA PMS 3 96 developed during the OHIO Class Submarine
Study. However, the tables and the contents have been
modified to reflect the changes in the focus of this study.
The inflation rates used were developed for the SCN
account using a current year basket of goods as the basis for
the index. Basing the index on the current year will provide
a conservative figure that will understate the effect of
inflation. These rates were chosen because of their direct
application to ship construction.
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B. OHIO CLASS SUBMARINE STUDY
The OHIO Class Submarine study methodology consisted of:
1. Determining the amount of excess material in the FSS and
the cost.
2. Identifying the shipbuilder's cost for the same material.
3. Calculating any additional FSS costs incurred.
4. Estimating additional costs for other activities
(such as SPCC s) .
5. Presenting the costs by alternative. [Ref. 11 :p. 3-6]
Each of PMS 396' s alternatives will be discussed along
with an explanation of how the numbers were derived. If it is
necessary to modify PMS 396' s numbers, the change will be
noted and the rational for doing so provided.
1 . ALTERNATIVE 1 - CFM PROCURED COMMERCIALLY
a. Material Identification
PMS 396 requested SPCC's help in determining the
amount of excess material in the FSS that would qualify for
transfer from CFM to GFM. PMS 396' s request included both
Navy cognizance and DLA cognizance items. For purposes of
this study, the DLA items are separated out and analyzed by
themselves
.
SPCC originally identified 5,952 CFM allowance
items that were available in the FSS [Ref. 11 :p. 6] . Of these
items, 5,462 were DLA cognizance material. From the 5,4 62, a
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representative sample of 1,111 DLA items (32.5%) were chosen
at random for inclusion in PMS 396' s study.
Jb . Shipbuilder ' s Cost
Once the 1,777 candidates were chosen, the NSA,
SUPSHIP Groton, obtained the shipbuilder's commercial cost for
each item. The cost estimate provided in 1986 was $380,636.39
[Ref . 11 :p. 8] . Since the other figures included in the study
were calculated in 1989 dollars, the shipbuilder's material
cost has been adjusted for inflation to more accurately
reflect it's value three years later. The adjusted material
cost is $419,210.45.
The shipbuilder used a material vendor procurement
agent to procure and stage a significant portion of the
material. In addition to the agent's material cost, there was
also a $85.00 per line item charge. The agent then totaled
the material cost and the line item charge and calculated a 6%
profit fee. In addition to the agent's fees, the shipbuilder
charged $30.00 per line item for all line items, plus a .168%
General and Administrative (G&A) fee on all costs and a 15.2%
profit fee on the total material cost and agent's fees [Ref.
ll:p. 7].
The agent was able to provide all 1,777 DLA items.
Thus, the total material cost for the DLA items can be used in
calculating the appropriate fees [Ref. 41] . This point is
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highlighted because in PMS 396' s study, the agent was unable
to obtain 30 items which affected the calculation of fees. It
was therefore necessary to manipulate the material cost when
the fees were determined- Table 4 provides the shipbuilder's











* Charge per item $53,310.00
* G & A $1,078.04
* Fee $89,433.89
TOTAL $143,821.93
CFM TOTAL COST $732,202.78
Once the sample costs were determined, the cost for
the 5,462 line items needed to be calculated. PMS 396
determined that the FSS cost of the 1,777 sample items in 1989
was $322,422.48. Since the non-adjusted shipbuilder material
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cost was $380,636.39, the increased material cost of the
commercially provided items over the FSS was $58,213.91 or
15.29% However, using the adjusted material cost of
$419,210.45, the difference between the FSS and the
shipbuilder's commercial cost was 96,787.97, or 23.08%.
Using this information, the shipbuilder' s cost of
all 5,462 line items can be extrapolated by multiplying the
FSS cost of all the line items by 23.08%. The total FSS
material cost of the 5,462 line items was $853,379.40 [Ref.
ll:p. 8]. Multiplying this figure by 23.08% yielded an
estimated commercial cost of $1,050,339.37. Adding the
material cost to the agent's line item charge and then
multiplying by the agent's profit fee of six percent gave the
agent a fee of $90,876.56.
Once the material cost and the agent's charges were
determined, the shipbuilders' s G & A and fee were calculated
for the 5,462 line items. Table 5 provides a total projected
cost of $2,016,352.30 for all 5,462 line items if the CFM was
commercially procured.
2. ALTERNATIVE 2 - CFM IS REQUISITIONED FROM THE FSS BY
THE SHIPBUILDER
Navy contractor access to the FSS for DLA material has
still not materialized. Before any shipbuilder is
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* Charge per item







CFM TOTAL COST $2, 016,352.30
authorized access, NAVSEA and NAVSUP must first negotiate the
process with DLA. If this option had been available, the
shipbuilder indicated that a procuring agent would not have
been used [Ref. ll:p. 10].
The cost to process a requisition in the FSS in 1989
was $12.00 per requisition for handling, storage, and material
issue [Ref. ll:p. 12]. Additional costs also have to be
factored in for SPCC and the NSA. The cost was $2,414.0 for
SPCC to perform the prescreening of the ISNSLs [Ref . ll:p. 12] .
As noted in Chapter IV, SPCC would require an additional two
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GS-11 level people for tracking the status of material at a
total cost of $80,000.00.
For the NSA to review, validate, and follow-up on
shipbuilder requisitions, they forecasted an increase of
$11,7 85.00 per year for manpower requirements. Table 6
provides the totals for Alternative 2.
TABLE 6















* Charge per item








CFM TOTAL COST $454,799.05 $1,333,311.75
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3. ALTERNATIVE 3 - CFM REQUISITIONED FROM THE FSS BY THE
GOVERNMENT
The third alternative determines the cost of the DLA
material if the Government requisitioned it through normal
supply channels. The cost of the material and requisition
processing charges are the same as Alternative 2. The obvious
difference is that there are no shipbuilder costs.
A new factor must be considered at this point. As
noted earlier, the NSA is responsible for submitting the
requisitions to the system. In addition, they must also track
and expedite the requisitions. The NSA, SUPSHIP Groton,
considers this to be a manpower intensive situation and
estimated it would require an increase of 3.75 manyears with
a cost of $81,721.00 [Ref. ll:p. 12].
Table 7 represents the cost of the Government using
the FSS. The costs of the sample items are listed first, then
the projected costs of the entire list of items.
4 . COMPARISONS
The previous sections have demonstrated the costs
under each alternative. The total projected cost of the
alternatives can now be compared to determine if one of the
alternatives is more cost effective. Table 8 is compilation
of the data from Tables 5,6, and 7.
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TABLE 7





MATERIAL COST $322,422.48 $853,379.40
FSS REQUISITION COST $21,324.00 $65,544.00
NSA MANPOWER COSTS N/A $81,721.00
SPCC COSTS N/A $82,414.00














































NSA MANPOWER COSTS N/A $11,785.00 $81,721.00
SPCC COSTS N/A $82,414.00 $82,414.00
CFM TOTAL COST $2,016,352.29 $1,333,311.75 $1,083,058. 40
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Alternative 1, the shipbuilder procuring the material
commercially, is the most expensive option at $2,016,352.29.
Alternative 2 eliminates the vendor procurement agent and
reduces the cost to $683,040.54. Alternative 3 is
$933,293.89, or 46.29%, less expensive than Alternative 1 and
$250,253.35, or 18.77%, less than Alternative 2.
The results here coincide closely with the PMS 396'
s
despite the additional costs included in this analysis. PMS
396 determined a cost savings of 41.7% for Alternative 3 over
Alternative 1 and a savings of 17.97% of Alterative 3 over
Alternative 2 [Ref. ll:p. 11].
Despite the additional costs, Alternative 3 is still
significantly more cost effective than Alternatives 1 and 2.
Because of the difficulties in providing the shipbuilder
access to DLA assets, Alternatives 1 and 3 are the only viable
avenues open to the PM. Based on a comparison of costs,
Alternative 3 makes the most economic sense.
C . FFG-7
The USS INGRAHAM (FFG-61) was delivered to the Navy on 07
July, 1989. During the ten year construction program, the
Program Office at NAVSEA was constantly striving to find ways
to reduce costs. As early as 1976, the gross disparity in
prices between what the shipbuilder charged and the cost in
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the FSS prompted NAVSEA PMS 399 personnel to begin searching
for a better system. The first step in their investigation
was to request pricing data for DLA items from one of the
shipbuilders, Bath Iron Works (BIW) , Bath, MA. BIW reported
that their prices were an estimated 200-400 percent over the
FSS' s [Ref . 42:p. 1]
.
The combination of this price escalation and the GAO
reports discussed in Chapter II led PMS 399 to initiate the
test program on FFGs 54 and 57. Although PMS 399 did not
perform an extensive cost analyze like PMS 396, they had
enough information after testing the CFM to GFM transfer
process to support their decision to transfer all CFM to GFM
for the DLA material in the fourth flight of ships [Ref. 43]
.
This section details the results of what analysis was done
after implementation of the PMS 399 decision. Comparison of
the cost savings between the shipbuilder' s costs (Alternative
1) and the FSS's cost (Alternative 3) verify the validity of
PMS 399' s decision.
Table 9 presents a limited sample of items where prices
were compared. The three shipbuilders, TODD Shipyards
Corporation San Pedro, TODD Shipyards Corporation Seattle, and
BIW, that constructed the FFG-7s all provided their material
costs. The cost for their overhead and the procuring agents
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overheads were not included. Those costs ran $50.00 to
$100.00 per item depending on the shipbuilder [Ref. 43].
The shipbuilder's price was higher than the FSS's except
in five cases. The shipbuilder's prices ranged from 100% to
TABLE 9
COST SAMPLE OF
MATERIAL IDENTIFIED TO NSNs









9Q 5140-00-369-4927 BOX, TOOL EA 2 43.36 86.72 54.85 61.24 41.08
9G 6240-01-134-6985 LAMP, INCAND EA 12 15.00 180.00 7.50 2.74 2.25
9N 5905-00-114-5393 RESISTOR EA 1 0.05 0.05 1.25 1.25 0.10
9Z 5320-00-254-4131 RIVET HD 1 4.70 4.70 18.40 18.40 4.35
9Z 5360-01-092-0065 SPRING EA 1 1.12 1.12 33.25 33.25 15. 40
9Z 5310-00-933-8121 WASHER HD 1 0.73 0.73 4.53 4.10 10.00
almost 3000% of the FSS's. If the minimum overhead cost is
added in, a $1.12 spring, NSN 9Z 5360-01-092-0065, costs
$83.25. A markup of 7433%.
Unfortunately, data is not available to demonstrate the
differences between the three alternatives for the same ship
as was done in the PMS 396 study. However, data is available
to compare the total costs of two different ships that were
outfitted using Alternatives 1 and 3.
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The USS GARY (FFG-51) was delivered on 02 November, 1984,
with all her DLA material being delivered by the shipbuilder.
The USS REUBEN JAMES (FFG-57) was delivered on 13 February,
1987 and was one of the fourth flight ships for which PMS 399
transferred all DLA line items, approximately 5300, from CFM
to GFM. The COSALs were both Mission Critically Oriented
(MCO) and the HM&E sections of the two ships did not vary
significantly [Ref. 44].
Table 10 provides the number of line items and the
original cost of all the DLA material, including both CFM and
GFM. Data was not available that would allow separating the
CFM from GFM and determining the exact costs for each.
However, once inflation is included, analysis of the numbers
allows a fair comparison because the only variation in the
outfitting of the ships was transferring CFM DLA material to
GFM [Ref. 45]
.
The $999,174.62 difference between the inflated totals is
the additional costs incurred as a result of using a
vendor's procurement agent and the shipbuilder's added fees.
Admittedly, a portion of this cost was the procurement cost of
the Navy cognizance items for which the shipbuilder was
responsible. In their test study, PMS 399 determined that
over 85% of the material that was considered CFM was DLA
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TABLE 10
COMPARISON OF DLA COGNIZANCE MATERIAL






















NSA/SPCC COSTS N/A N/A
CFM TOTAL COST 3, 083,478.16 $2, 084,303.55
cognizance items [Ref . 46] . 'Therefore, a rough estimate of
the savings can be calculated by multiplying $999,174.61 by
85%. By transferring the 5300 DLA line items from CFM to GFM
on the FFG-57, PMS 399 recognized a savings of approximately
$849,298.42, or 27.54%.
At this point, it is appropriate to discuss the
differences in labor costs between the PMS 396 and PMS 399
4 PMS 396 established that the percent of DLA material
that was CFM in their OHIO Class Submarine Study was 8 9%
(Study :p. 5) .
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studies. PMS 399 did not increase manpower at SUPSHIP Long
Beach, to process the additional workload of over 15,000 line
items. In fact, SUPSHIP Long Beach, was also able to procure
a significant number of CF items for the shipbuilder with the
manpower they had [Ref . 20] . There were no additional SPCC
costs as the task of categorizing the material as GFM or CFM
fell to the NSA [Ref. 47]
.
D. USS SUPPLY (AOE-6)
The outfitting process on the AOE-6 is essentially a
modified Alternative 3. To qualify for transfer from CFM to
GFM, the DLA cognizance items must have an FSS price of less
than $100.00. The $100.00 dividing line was chosen to limit
the additional costs to the SCN Outfitting Account [Ref. 24] .
SUPSHIP, San Diego, has not performed a detailed cost
study on the differences between the shipbuilder's costs and
the FSS's. One of the primary reasons, besides the cost of
the study itself, is that the shipbuilder uses multiple item
Purchase Orders (PO) to obtain material [Ref. 24] . Using
multiple POs, the shipbuilder can obtain a number of items on
one document. This makes the cost per line item difficult to
determine.
The AOE-6 is still 14 months from delivery. Although
there is no definitive data, the initial impression of
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personnel at SUPSHIP, San Diego, is that they are saving a
considerable amount of money. Further research needs to be
conducted to determine if all DLA material should transfer
vice just that under $100.00.
E. CONCLUSIONS
1. FFG-7/SSBN 735
Intuitively, it makes sense that the same item will
cost more if the shipbuilder has to buy it than if it is
supplied by the FSS. However, the hidden costs need to be
ferreted out to determine the real cost advantages.
Table 11 lists the results of each of the alternatives
for the FFG-7 and OHIO Class Submarine outfitting costs. It
is easy to see that Alternative 3 is the least cost
alternative for the Government. Comparing the two programs is
difficult because of the difference in the number of line
items and configurations between the classes. However, when
compared on costs, both programs clearly demonstrate that
using the FSS is more cost effective for the Government.
2. FUTURE PROCUREMENTS
Trying to anticipate the cost of anything is a chancy
operation at best. Trying to predict the cost of material to
the Navy is even tougher. However, since the purpose of this
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TABLE 11










FFG-51/57 $3,083,478.16 $1,899,239.55 $849,298.42 27.54%
thesis is to give policy makers a tool with which to make
decisions, it is appropriate to present an educated guess as
to the cost savings the Navy might realize from Alternative 3.
Tables 12, 13, and 14 display the cost savings potential for
the shipbuilding schedule from FY 91 to FY 97 for seven
classes of ships [Ref 48] . To keep all calculations in this
thesis consistent, the totals have been discounted to 1989.
However, several points must be made about the numbers in
these tables.
First, it should be noted that the number of CFM line
items for each class of ship is not exact. Configurations
change with such frequency that an accurate count that would
apply to all ships in the class is impossible. In addition,
current numbers for the ships were not available from SPCC
except for the DDG-51 and TRIDENT Classes [Ref 49] . The line
items for all other classes of ships were based on research
done by Masters and include both Navy and DLA cognizance items
in the CFM [Ref. 2:p. 34]. To compensate for potential
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inaccuracies, Table 13 represents the costs savings if the CFM
line items were actually 10% less and Table 14 further reduces
them by 20%.
Second, the Alternative 1 cost per line item was
estimated by dividing the PMS 396 shipbuilder's total cost by
the number of line items. Dividing 5,462 line items into the
total cost of $2,016,352.29 yielded an average cost of $369
per line item. This figure represents a realistic price that
a Program Manger should expect to pay per line item if the
shipbuilder procures the material using an agent. To obtain
the total Alternative 1 cost, the number of line items per
ship class will be multiplied by $369.
Third, the cost differences discovered between
Alternatives 1 and 3 in the FFG-7 and OHIO Class Submarine
programs appear to be valid results. However, the OHIO Class
Submarine's figures present a more accurate cost picture
because of the opportunity costs included in the data. Also,
the methodology used to determine the cost savings in the FFG-
7 case study was not as robust as the OHIO Class Submarine
study. Therefore, to demonstrate the difference between
Alternative 1 and Alternative 3, the commercial cost of
material per ship will be multiplied by 46.29% to establish
the possible cost savings.
68
Fourth, the FFG-7 Class data demonstrates all DLA
material that is CFM which can be transferred to GFM without
impacting outfitting availability and operational readiness.
Therefore, all CFM DLA cognizance material is included as GFM.
Fifth, this discussion has purposely excluded the
surcharges on the FSS line items that have resulted from the
unit costing initiative in the Defense Management Review
(DMR) . It would have been possible to include surcharges for
each line item in the calculations for both the FFG-7s and the
OHIO Class Submarines. However, that would have skewed the
data because the corresponding rise in commercial prices and
labor costs for the shipbuilder could not be determined.
Escalating costs are a fact of life and in order to compare
apples to apples, all costs have been converted to 198 9
dollars
.
Finally, Table 15 summarizes Tables 12 through 14 by
providing estimated savings that the Government could realize
if the seven shipbuilding programs transfer their DLA CFM to
GFM. Although each program's savings will vary depending on
the actual CFM DLA line item count and current procurement
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. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis achieves the goals and objectives laid out in
the first chapter. It has shown that Alternative 3,
Contractor Furnished Material (CFM) obtained through the
Federal Supply System (FSS) , is the most cost effective of the
three alternatives for initial ship outfitting. Hidden
opportunity costs that could affect each of the alternatives
have been discussed and quantified. The impacts that shifting
responsibility for all CFM DLA items to the Government could
have on material availability, SCN funding, and shipbuilding
contracts have been addressed. The primary conclusions and
recommendations are presented below.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions can be drawn from the tables,
examples, and calculations in this thesis.
1. Alternative 3 meets the requirements of higher authority
and is the most cost effective of the alternatives.
2. The Government can obtain Contractor Furnished DLA
material through the FSS and save over 4 6% of the
shipbuilder's cost.
3. DLA outfitting material availability is at least as good,
if not better, using the FSS for mature programs. For
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new programs, some initial problems in availability might
exist until adequate inventory levels are established.
4
.
Contract changes are not necessary to implement the
transfer of CFM to GFM.
5. It is possible to use existing SCN End Item Account funds
to requisition CFM material from the FSS
.
6. The use of a vendor's procuring agent to procure the
material greatly increases the cost without necessarily
ensuring availability.
7 There are costs to the overall system, such as manpower
costs at SPCC and requisition processing costs, that are
not visible to the Program Managers at Naval Sea Systems
Command but must be taken into account when procuring
outfitting material.
8 The Ship Program Managers at NAVSEA would be willing to
transfer all DLA CFM to GFM as long as availability was
not affected.
B. ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVE 3
1 . ADVANTAGES
The preceding analysis has supported several
advantages to using Alternative 3 that were identified by PMS




"Just in Time" inventory philosophy could be employed
because the shipbuilder would not be buying and storing
for more than one ship at a time.
2. Shipbuilder is freed to devote more time and effort to
providing CFM allowance material not in the FSS.
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3. Higher allowance material availability at delivery.
4. Outfitting dollars are incrementally obligated during
ship construction as opposed to earlier obligation when
shipbuilding contract is awarded.
5. Government has automated on-line requisitioning through
the NSA.
6. System can be applied to any shipbuilding program.
7. Does not require training shipbuilder personnel in FSS
material requisitioning and status interpretation.
8. Government can save 40% by transferring all CFM DLA
material to GFM.
2 . DISADVANTAGES
The disadvantages to Alternative 3 are:
1. Increased number of requisitions through the OSA.
2. Increased level of effort at the NSA may be required.
3. Increased level of effort at SPCC is required.
4. SCN outfitting funds may be open for reprogramming.
[Ref.llip. 17]
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the foregoing chapters, it appears that all
shipbuilding programs should immediately transfer all DLA
cognizance CFM to GFM and have the NSAs requisition it from
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the FSS. In order to achieve the above, the following
concerns must be addressed:
Material Availability - Increased communication between
the NAVSEA Program Manager, NAVSUP, SPCC, and DLA is
required to effectively implement the policy for all
shipbuilding programs. A recommendation is for the New
Construction Provisioning Study Group to initiate
meetings with DLA.
SPCC Manpower Additions - In order to adequately prepare
for the increased workload at SPCC, it is recommended
that SPCC coordinate its requirements with NAVSUP and
NAVSEA to ensure the required manpower is in place.
NSA Manpower Additions - The requirement for additional
personnel at the NSA is open to debate. It is
recommended that PMS 396 conduct a post delivery study on
the NSAs workload during the outfitting of SSBNs 740-742.
Based on the results, Pms and the NSAs will be able to
more accurately predict the additional manpower required.
4. Budgeting - PMS 396 has adequately demonstrated that
there exists an avenue to fund the additional FSS
requisitions through the NSA. The recommendation is for
all PMs to adopt this procedure.
5. Contracting - To ensure standardization across all
shipbuilding programs, it is recommended that NAVSEA
develop standard clause contracts which provide the
Government the option for procuring CFM allowance
material [Ref. ll:p. 18].
6. Outfit Supply Activity (OSA) - There should not be a
noticeable impact at the OSA unless the requirements of
the DMR force a change in operating procedures [Ref. 50] .
If a change does occur, further communication with the
OSA will be necessary.
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The latest changes brought about by the Defense Management
Reviews (DMR) have not been included in this thesis. Because
most of the DMR initiatives have not been fully implemented or
are still under consideration, their consequences could not be
factored in.
One DMR that will impact new construction outfitting is
the transferring of all 1H and 3H cognizance material to DLA.
A second is the unit costing accounting policy that the
Department of Defense (DOD) is starting to require commands to
use for determining operational costs. Both of these
initiatives have the potential to change the methods and
policies currently in place for outfitting ships. Further
analysis is needed to adequately assess the impact the DMR
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